Event

Over the last three decades a highly inaccurate view of Mongolia’s early transition experience has circulated widely. That view can be summarized as: ‘International Financial Institutions (IFIs) imposed shock therapy on Mongolia, with disastrous results that caused terrible hardships for the Mongolian economy and people for many years.’This talk will argue that this view is incorrect from beginning to end. First, Mongolia never underwent shock therapy, although there were some Mongolian economists who would have liked to, and some very partial steps toward it were indeed taken.Secondly, to the extent that it was tried it was a purely Mongolian initiative; the IFIs never imposed or even proposed any such agenda. Thirdly, and most importantly, the very real shock that the Mongolian economy and population experienced in the early 1990s was due to the abrupt end to the massive support that the Soviet Union had been providing to Mongolia in the 1980s, and to the collapse of COMECON trading arrangements into which Mongolia had been fully integrated. The reforms and external assistance from the IFIs and others were an attempt to moderate and overcome that shock; they were in no way the cause of the shock.lt will conclude with discussion of the harm that this myth has caused, and the importance of getting the history right.Bill Bikales is a Harvard-trained development economist whose research has focused primarily economic and social trends in China and Mongolia, but who has also worked and resided in Ukraine and the Philippines. His most recent post was as Lead Economist in the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in China. He lived in Mongolia for six months in 1991, and then from 1993-2001, where he received the Friendship Medal from President N. Bagabandi, and medal from Bank of Mongolia Governor O. Chuluunbat.